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Disciplines, the Infancy Doctrine, and the 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment 
Cheryl B. Preston* & Brandon T. Crowther** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Teens have emerged as a powerful market segment, especially with 
respect to online goods and services.  In 2011, they commanded an 
estimated $91.1 billion in buying power.1  As of 2011, 80% of teens use 
social networking sites, a dramatic increase over the 55% who did so just 
five years earlier.2  In 2010, an estimated twenty million minors used 
Facebook,3 and approximately 44% do so weekly.4  Even when teens do 
not directly pay for services, such as social networks and chat rooms, the 
providers of these programs depend on their presence in droves to 
persuade advertisers to pay for space.5  This burst of economic leverage 
                                                     
*   Edwin M. Thomas Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University.  We gratefully thank Timothy West, Eli McCann, and the BYU Law Library Reference 
staff who assisted with research and editing, as well as many colleagues who offered substantive 
suggestions.  We dedicate this paper to the delightful, brilliant, energetic, and thoughtful people who 
are the future of our economy, country, and world and who are now under age eighteen.  
**  J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 
1.  Teen Market to Surpass $200 Billion by 2011, Despite Population Decline, MARKETING 
CHARTS (June 28, 2007), http://www.marketingcharts.com/interactive/teen-market-to-surpass-200-
billion-by-2011-despite-population-decline-817; see also Cheryl B. Preston, CyberInfants, 39 PEPP. 
L. REV. 225, 267–70 (2012) (discussing minors’ importance in the marketplace). 
 2.  AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW INTERNET, TEENS, KINDNESS AND CRUELTY ON SOCIAL 
NETWORK SITES: HOW AMERICAN TEENS NAVIGATE THE NEW WORLD OF “DIGITAL CITIZENSHIP” 
16 (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2011/PIP_Teens_Kindness_ 
Cruelty_SNS_Report_Nov_2011_FINAL_110711.pdf. 
 3.  Online Exposure, CONSUMER REPORTS, June 2011, at 30. 
 4.  Koby Oppenheimer, Social Networking Sites: Growing Use Among Tweens and Teens, but 
a Growing Threat As Well?, TRENDS & TUDES, Apr. 2008, at 1, http://harrisinteractive.com/news/ 
newsletters/K12news/HI_TrendsTudes_2008_v07_i03.pdf. 
 5.  See Gwenn Schurgin O’Keeffe, et al., The Impact of Social Media on Children, 
Adolescents, and Families, 127 PEDIATRICS 800, 802 (2011) (discussing the widespread use and 
impact of advertising on social media). 
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will certainly foreground the contract infancy doctrine, which permits a 
person under age eighteen to void a contract, with a few exceptions. 
The continued viability of the infancy doctrine has been the subject 
of recent dispute.  In a dramatic move, the reporters of the Restatement 
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment in 2011 selected a minority 
rule requiring minors to make restitution of benefits enjoyed under 
voided contracts,6 a rule that Professor Perillo suggests has very little or 
no support outside of New Hampshire.7  While the Restatement is just 
advisory and other language in the same section may be used by judges 
to avoid the harsh results of this rule,8 now is the time to explore the 
continuing viability of the infancy doctrine. 
We have elaborated in detail elsewhere on the parameters of the 
infancy doctrine, its exceptions, and its defenses.9  The purpose of this 
Article is to compare the infancy doctrine in contract law to the treatment 
of minors in other areas of law. This comparison will help to determine if 
the law generally has abandoned the protective view of youth that 
animates the infancy doctrine.10  The Article begins with a brief 
overview of the infancy doctrine and moves to critiques, including 
claims that the doctrine is inconsistent with other areas of law; is 
arbitrary and inappropriately tied to a fixed day rather than individual 
maturity levels; is without special constitutional support; and is unfair to 
an adult who fails to heed the infancy doctrine’s warning about making 
money off minors.  The Article demonstrates that persons under age 
eighteen—or sometimes seventeen or twenty-one—are still treated 
differently than adults across disciplines, the general consensus being 
that the legal disabilities afforded minors are warranted to protect against 
vulnerabilities that most outgrow as they mature.   
It is true that a smattering of laws attempt to balance particular 
competing interests within the principle of protecting youth.11  When 
                                                     
 6.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 33 (2011).  For a 
discussion of the majority approach to restitution for minors’ voided contracts, see Cheryl B. Preston 
& Brandon T. Crowther, Infancy Doctrine Inquiries, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 47, 62–63 (2012). 
 7.  Joseph M. Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Context and the Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1007, 1016–17 (2011); see also 
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 8.8 (6th ed. 2009) (New Hampshire 
rule) [hereinafter CALAMARI & PERILLO]. 
 8.  For further discussion of RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT, 
see infra Part 0. 
 9.  Preston & Crowther, supra note 6, at 47–66. 
 10.  See id. at 64–66 (citing and refuting some of the major sources of criticism of the infancy 
doctrine). 
 11.  See infra Part II. 
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viewed at the surface, some laws governing adolescent rights and 
responsibilities thus appear piecemeal and inconsistent.12  When 
examined more closely, however, each legal framework is internally 
consistent with the goal of protecting minors and preserving parental 
responsibility through minors’ vulnerable years.  Further, each seeming 
exception is based on particular concerns not shared in contract law.   
A study of other laws and exceptions actually reinforces the 
underlying rationales for the contract infancy doctrine and shows it to be 
worth preserving.  As we have discussed elsewhere, the infancy doctrine 
may need further tailoring to better balance the interests of minors 
against those of adults in some markets.13  But, the essential 
characteristics of the doctrine remain viable and should not be changed 
by judicial fiat without thoughtful, consensus legislative action.  The 
Article concludes that minors today are still in need of protections,14 if 
not more so.15 
Part II of this Article briefly reviews the present contours of the 
infancy doctrine and then discusses the proposed treatment of the infancy 
doctrine in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment.  Part III first reviews various critiques of the infancy 
doctrine. It then addresses many of the most significant laws applicable 
to minors and views the internal structure of such laws in comparison 
with the protections afforded to minors under the contract infancy 
doctrine.  Part IV examines the arbitrary nature of the date of legal 
adulthood, a characteristic common to laws governing minority in all 
fields.  It considers the option for an individualized, case-by-case, 
determination of maturity.  Part V examines constitutional principles for 
protecting minors.  Part VI concludes that legislatures should be 
responsible for any potential changes to the current laws protecting 
minors—rather than the courts, even those relying on the Third 
Restatement. 
                                                     
 12.  Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51 
HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1267 (2000). 
 13.  Preston & Crowther, supra note 6, at 78–79. 
 14.  Major scientific research supporting the infancy doctrine is discussed in Cheryl B. Preston 
& Brandon T. Crowther, Legal Osmosis: Brain Science and the Infancy Doctrine (forthcoming). 
 15.  For example, minors are leaving their parents’ homes at a later age than they did in 
previous decades.  Jordan Stanger-Ross et al., Falling Far From the Tree: Transitions to Adulthood 
and the Social History of Twentieth-Century America, 34 SOC. SCI. HIST. 625, 627 (2010); see also 
Preston & Crowther, supra note 14 (discussing social science evidence about minors postponing 
adulthood). 
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II. THE RULE AND THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
A. The Rule 
 
The infancy doctrine, which permits a person who enters a contract 
while under legal age to void the contract during infancy and a short time 
into adulthood, was established in the common law before the American 
Constitution.16  The doctrine is based on the recognition that “minors are 
generally more vulnerable to exploitation than adults and less capable of 
comprehending the nature of the legal obligations associated with a 
contract.”17  The established exceptions and defenses account for the 
occasional difficulty in the doctrine’s application and for those 
circumstances where applying the doctrine would be unjust. 
The most common defense to the infancy doctrine is that the contract 
provided necessities for the minor, such as food, clothing, and medical 
care, when a parent or guardian will not or cannot provide them.18  
Historically, an adult who successfully asserts this defense is entitled to 
retain the quantum meruit value of the consideration she received under 
the contract, rather than enforcement of the contract as written.19  A 
similar defense based on emancipation applies if the minor is married, in 
the military, or abandoned by parents.20  These defenses are justified by 
the welfare of the minor, not the impact on adult contracting parties.  The 
law encourages adults to assist minors who must fend for themselves.21  
This is a narrow exception to the doctrine’s intended purpose, which is to 
discourage adults from imposing economic commitments on children and 
teens.22 
                                                     
 16.  See 5 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 9:2 (4th ed. 2009) [hereinafter 
WILLISTON].  See generally Melvin John Dugas, Comment, The Contractual Capacity of Minors: A 
Survey of the Prior Law and the New Articles, 62 TUL. L. REV. 745 (1988) (providing a detailed 
discussion of early developments of infancy protections in French and Roman law and how these 
principles became incorporated into Louisiana law). 
 17.  Preston, supra note 1, at 232; see also City of N.Y. v. Stringfellow’s of N.Y., Ltd., 684 
N.Y.S.2d 544, 550–51 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).  
 18.  WILLISTON, supra note 16, §§ 9:18–9:21. 
 19.  Preston, supra note 1, at 232; see also WILLISTON, supra note 16, § 9:18; M.O. 
Regensteiner, Annotation, Right of Infant Who Repudiates Contract for Services to Recover Thereon 
or in Quantum Meruit, 35 A.L.R.2D 1302 § 2(a) (1954). 
 20.  WILLISTON, supra note 16, § 9:4. 
 21.  See id. (stating that parents attempting to relieve themselves from liability by emancipating 
the child is contrary to public policy). 
 22.  42 AM. JUR. 2D Infants § 39 (2011). 
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The “retains benefit” defense, another narrow exception, is focused 
on the economic loss of the contracting adult.23  In most jurisdictions, the 
adult can require the minor to return the tangible remnant of the item 
sold to the minor, as long as it is still in the minor’s possession, as a 
condition of the adult’s duty to return the payment made by the minor.24 
The minor’s obligation extends no further. 
Another defense protects adults who determine that, in good faith on 
a reasonable investigation of the other party’s evidence of age, they are 
dealing with an adult, although that belief is later proven wrong.25  
Fraudulent misrepresentation of age is also a defense to the infancy 
doctrine in some states.26  In other states, the adult’s option is to bring an 
action in tort for fraud.27  The duty of adults to investigate sufficiently  a 
minor’s representation of her age so as to reasonably rely in good faith 
on it28 traces to the supposition that adults know that minors have 
incentive to lie about age to satisfy short-term interests.29 
In rare and exceptional cases, courts have denied the benefit of the 
infancy doctrine to a minor who has demonstrated sufficient bad faith 
and intentional purpose to defraud.30  For instance, malicious destruction 
of the consideration or actions with no justification but spite or injury to 
adults qualify.31 
Some courts are bent on creating context-specific defenses.  
Exceptions may be warranted to permit waivers as a condition for 
participation in children’s recreational sports sponsored by volunteers,32 
arbitration regarding necessary medical treatment,33 or employment 
                                                     
 23.  Preston, supra note 1, at 232. 
 24.  Id. at 232; Preston & Crowther, supra note 6, at 62–63. 
 25.  Preston, supra note 1, at 233. 
 26.  Infants, supra note 22, § 101; e.g., Nichols v. English, 154 S.E.2d 239, 240 (Ga. 1967). 
 27.  WILLISTON, supra note 16, § 9:22; see also Royal Fin. Co. v. Schaefer, 330 S.W.2d 129, 
130 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (“[A]n infant who induces another to contract with him by misrepresenting 
that he is of age to the adult’s resulting injury, is liable in tort.”).  
 28.  A.D. Kaufman, Annotation, Infant’s Misrepresentation as to His Age as Estopping Him 
from Disaffirming His Voidable Transaction, 29 A.L.R.3D 1270 § 3 (1970); see, e.g., KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 38-103 (2010) (“No contract can be thus disaffirmed in cases where, on account of the 
minor’s own misrepresentations as to his majority . . . the other party had good reasons to believe 
the minor capable of contracting.” (emphasis added)). 
 29.  Preston, supra note 1, at 233.   
 30.  Preston, supra note 1, at 233. 
 31.  Id.; see, e.g., Rivera v. Reading Hous. Auth., 819 F. Supp. 1323, 1331–32 (E.D. Pa. 1993) 
(“[Infancy doctrine] is not to be employed as a vehicle whereby the minor is enabled to practice 
unconscionable business methods.” (quoting Pankas v. Bell, 198 A.2d 312, 315 (Pa. 1964))). 
 32.  See, e.g., Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ohio 1998). 
 33.  See, e.g., Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1965); Leong ex rel. Leong v. Kaiser 
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agreements in states allowing minors to work without parental consent.34  
However, these exceptions should be made by legislatures who weigh 
competing public interests, not randomly by courts.35 
 
B. The Restatement 
 
The continued viability of the infancy doctrine is threatened by the 
2011 publication of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment.  The change did not result from a reasoned reconsideration 
in the process of adopting a restatement of contracts, and it was flown 
under the radar of most contract professors and scholars.  The change is 
not simply an elaboration of traditional restitution and unjust enrichment 
theories; it could be interpreted as an attempt to gut centuries of the 
infancy doctrine. 
The Restatement has two sections that address minors’ liability in 
restitution.  Section 16 deals with when the minor is the transferor and 
section 33 addresses the minor as the recipient.36  Both of these sections 
apply to minors, but they were written broadly to also apply to mental 
incapacity and municipal corporations.37  In trying to unify the law of 
restitution for all forms of incapacity, the Restatement takes a position 
that does not reflect current law relating to minority.  Because the two 
relevant Restatement sections share the same underlying policy and 
overarching changes, this Article focuses its criticism on section 33 for 
simplicity. 
Section 33(1) of the Restatement provides that, when a minor 
disaffirms a contract, the other party to the contract has a claim for 
restitution against the minor, regardless of whether the contract involved 
a necessary.38  The point of the infancy doctrine is to protect minors from 
their own bad judgment and remove the incentives for adults to deal with 
                                                                                                                       
Found. Hosps., 788 P.2d 164, 169 (Haw. 1990). 
 34.  See, e.g., Sheller ex rel. Sheller v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 150, 153–
54 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Douglass v. Pfleuger Haw., Inc., 135 P.3d 129, 138 (Haw. 2006). 
 35.  See infra Part 0. 
 36.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 16, 33 (2011). 
 37.  Id. § 16 cmt. a. 
 38.  The Restatement provides in § 33(1): 
A person who renders performance under an agreement that is unenforceable by reason 
of the other party’s legal incapacity has a claim in restitution against the recipient as 
necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.  There is no unjust enrichment if the claimant 
receives the counterperformance specified by the parties’ unenforceable agreement. 
Id. § 33(1); see also id. § 16(1) (providing for the same rule where the minor is the transferor rather 
than the recipient). 
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minors without parental involvement.39  The purpose of the necessities 
exception is mercy for the minor who is abandoned to her own devices 
and must contract for survival.40  Thus, the necessities exception protects 
adults by allowing such a minor to contract for food, shelter, medical 
care, and even transportation to work.41 This rewriting of the law has 
gutted the infancy doctrine through the back door of a remedies 
restatement, without confronting it head on in a contracts restatement, 
and, more importantly, without the input of the state legislatures, which 
have enacted the infancy doctrine in every state. 
In addition, the Restatement demands restitution even if the adult is 
fully aware that the contracting party is a minor.42  The only restriction in 
the Restatement is that the adult must deal “with the [minor] in good 
faith on reasonable terms.”43  While this prerequisite is certainly better 
than none, it burdens the minor seeking to avoid the transaction with the 
necessity of proving a lack of good faith or unreasonable terms.  In 
addition, an adult may charge a reasonable price for a trivial luxury item 
of limited use that the minor doesn’t need and cannot foresee the burdens 
of the payments.  The infancy doctrine squarely addresses this problem 
that is swept under the carpet in the Restatement.   
Secondly, the presumptions of the infancy doctrine assume that the 
minor is disadvantaged by having to conduct complicated factual 
inquiries and litigation.44  As a result, the infancy doctrine presents 
mostly bright-line rules that have a clear outcome.  The Restatement 
undoes this by requiring evidence of reasonable terms and good faith on 
the part of the adult.  While a reasonable price may be discernible from 
comparables and experts,45 a finding of good faith often boils down to 
the imputation of nuanced motives and dueling testimony.  Litigation 
based on such nuances is extremely expensive.  We predict that when all 
of the evidence is in, a jury will still have the same assumptions about 
the incompetency and lack of judgment of children and teens that 
motivated the adoption of the infancy doctrine in the first place.  Thus, 
                                                     
 39.  Preston & Crowther, supra note 6, at 50, 63. 
 40.  Id. at 52. 
 41.  Id. at 53. 
 42.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 33 cmt. f. 
 43.  Id. § 33(2). 
 44.  See infra Part IV (discussing how repeat players are benefited—and minors 
disadvantaged—with case-by-case determinations and complicated factual inquiries). 
 45.  See, e.g., MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. BP Solar Int’l Inc., 9 A.3d 508, 530 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 2010) (finding an expert witness competent to testify about the reasonable price for 
silicon powder in a breach of contract case). 
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the Restatement suggests a change in law that takes away the certainty of 
administration, increases expense, and is likely to end in the same result 
on the law in those cases where litigation is pursued.  The unfortunate 
and significant difference is that the threat of such litigation will likely 
intimidate a minor into succumbing to the adult’s demands and foregoing 
the right to avoid the contract.  The Restatement effectively reverses 
existing law by making the minor’s right too complex and expensive to 
assert. 
After appearing to create expansive liability for contracting minors, 
the drafters of the Restatement then seem to backpedal to soften this 
result, but they do so by adding even more litigation complexity and 
expense.  Section 33(3) provides a general and somewhat puzzling 
caveat: “Notwithstanding the unjust enrichment of the recipient, 
restitution may be limited or denied if it would be inconsistent with the 
protection that the doctrine of incapacity is intended to afford in the 
circumstances of the case.”46  Discerning the intent of the doctrine of 
incapacity is not difficult for one who reads the cases or summaries.  
This intent is to allow minors to avoid contracts unless the contract was 
for a necessity or fell into one of the other developed exceptions.47  
Taken literally, this provision simply reinstates the protection of the 
infancy doctrine and the results that the facts of a case would reach under 
the existing infancy doctrine.   
So what is the point of the Restatement’s changes?  The Restatement 
takes away the infancy doctrine’s clear, easy-to-apply standards, 
developed over centuries, and gives a court—after the minor is forced 
into litigation—vague and unbounded discretion to do something to 
avoid a skewed result.  The Restatement removes the clarity that allowed 
minors to make clear to adults that their chances of recovery are slim and 
therefore that an out-of-court settlement is wise. 
In defending the changes, the official comment c to section 33 makes 
flawed assumptions about the infancy doctrine.  While recognizing that 
all disability doctrines are intended as protection, the comment states that 
“a person who lacks the capacity to undertake a legally binding 
obligation is foreclosed from participating in transactions that may be 
advantageous or even vitally necessary.”48  This conclusion is simply 
false with respect to the infancy doctrine and in most other mental 
                                                     
 46.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 33(3). 
 47.  See Preston & Crowther, supra note 6, at 50–51. 
 48.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 33 cmt. c. 
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incapacity doctrines as well.  In such doctrines, a contract is voidable at 
the election of the person with the disability; it is not void and the adult 
cannot disavow the contract.49  A minor may choose to retain any 
contract if it is advantageous. 
In cases where it is necessary for a minor to contract without parental 
approval, let alone “vitally necessary,” both the necessities and 
emancipation defenses to the infancy doctrine render the contract 
enforceable.50  In other cases, parents have the right to be involved.  A 
parent who approves a transaction can cosign or otherwise accept 
liability that will make advantageous contracts enforceable. 
Comment c continues to opine: “Significant costs are imposed on the 
other party to the transaction, whenever a person who has dealt in good 
faith with an incapacitated counterparty is required to forfeit an 
otherwise valid legal entitlement.”51  An adult that makes a good faith 
effort to verify age will not suffer forfeiture under the infancy doctrine.  
The fraudulent misrepresentation of age is an established defense to the 
infancy doctrine.52  An adult who discovers the other party is a minor can 
either decide not to enter a contract or take that risk.  The changes in the 
Restatement shift the costs to the incapacitated party, who is already 
disadvantaged in a transaction with a fully capable adult. 
Finally, comment c concludes that liability should be determined 
case by case, weighing each point on a cost–benefit scale: “It follows 
that the contours of legal responsibility in these cases are determined, not 
by measuring ‘capacity to contract’ against some a priori standard, but 
by weighing at each point the value of the protection secured against the 
cost of securing it.”53  The cost of such litigation based on vague 
balancing of values is not only an inefficient waste of judicial resources, 
it also virtually ensures that challenges to enforcement are never brought.  
Moreover, implicit in this fact-intensive weighing is an examination of 
the vulnerability and “maturity” of the particular minor, an endeavor the 
Supreme Court has expressly identified as systematically prejudicial to 
minors.54  Part IV addresses the reasons behind the choice to base 
                                                     
 49.  7 JOSEPH M. PERILLO ET AL., CORBIN ON CONTRACT § 27.2 (Rev. ed. 1993). 
 50.  See supra text accompanying notes 18–20. 
 51.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 33 cmt. c. 
 52.  Preston & Crowther, supra note 6, at 59–62; see also supra text accompanying notes 26–
28. 
 53.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 33 cmt. c. 
 54.  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010), discussed in Part IV infra. 
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infancy incapacity on a bright-line age and all of the legal consequences 
that entails.55 
The Restatement clearly tries to create a theoretical framework to 
make a minor liable on the contract although the contract has been 
avoided,56 a convoluted way of simply removing the right to avoid in the 
first place.  In doing so, the Restatement recognizes well-accepted 
exceptions, such as the doctrines of necessaries, the duty to return 
consideration still in the minor’s possession, and others.57  However, the 
Restatement does not simply “adopt a broad rule of liability for benefits 
received,” as it acknowledges.58  Rather, it knowingly elevates a minority 
rule that minors must account for depreciation of the consideration 
received—a rule so rare that it has avoided any sincere scrutiny to date.59 
Only one contract commentator, Professor Joseph Perillo, has 
addressed the merits of the new Restatement’s position on the infancy 
doctrine.  Although Professor Perillo in two short paragraphs approves, 
arguing that minors “should be held to their bargains, other than their 
entry into credit transactions,”60 he acknowledges that the new 
Restatement position has very little support outside of New Hampshire.61 
The purpose of restatements is to restate the existing law to simplify 
and clarify the case law, unless there is a compelling reason to modernize 
or make a global policy change.  The founding committee of the 
American Law Institute “recommended that the first undertaking of the 
Institute should address uncertainty in the law through a restatement of 
basic legal subjects that would tell judges and lawyers what the law was.  
The formulation of such a restatement thus became ALI’s first 
endeavor.”62  If there is a reason to make a global policy change in the 
infancy doctrine, legislatures should do it, not courts. 
Social judgments about the relative costs and benefits of the infancy 
doctrine have been established in its contours, exceptions, and defenses.  
                                                     
 55.  See infra Part IV. 
 56.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 33 cmt. d 
(discussing a minor’s liability in restitution despite avoidance of liability in contract). 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. § 33 reporter’s notes, cmt. d. 
 59.  Id.  For more discussion on this minority rule, see Preston & Crowther, supra note 6, at 62–
63.  For a discussion of the majority approach to restitution for minors’ voided contracts, see id. at 
62–64. 
 60.  Perillo, supra note 7.  
 61.  Id.; see also CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 7. 
 62.  ALI Overview, AM. L. INST., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.institute 
projects (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
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These have been reified in many state statutes.  The Restatement’s 
support for a minority rule is misplaced. 
III. TREATMENT OF MINORS ACROSS LEGAL DISCIPLINES 
One concern with the infancy doctrine is that it is outdated and has 
failed to keep up with developments in other areas of law affecting 
adolescents.  Thus, retaining its protections is no longer warranted.  In 
other words, do advancements in the way other areas of the law treat 
minors demonstrate that contract law is particularly anachronistic, as 
some commentators have suggested?  This Part begins with a review of 
those critics who argue that the law’s treatment of minors is hopelessly 
jumbled and without bedrock principles.  Then we will survey a number 
of legal disciplines’ conceptions and treatments of minors.  This Part 
concludes that, upon close examination, the field of adolescent law 
reveals fundamental consistency and illustrates the principles that justify 
the continued application of the infancy doctrine.  Undeniably, some 
areas of the law hold minors more or less responsible based on various 
rationales promoting policy justifications specific to the law in those 
areas.  It is crucial to identify, in each of these cases, which policy 
considerations support courts’ decisions to hold minors more accountable 
in these few instances and how the principles remain fundamentally 
consistent. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that “[c]hildren have a very 
special place in life which law should reflect.”63  United States law does 
reflect this “special place,” as seen by the numerous carve-outs and 
individual rules in most of the major areas of law.  Some recent 
commentators assert that these laws are inconsistent, do not reflect our 
understanding about minors, or otherwise warrant abandonment of the 
infancy doctrine.  For example, Professor Juanda Daniel criticizes the 
infancy doctrine by arguing: 
[O]ther areas of American law recognize that minors are capable of 
understanding and appreciating their legal actions and thus afford 
minors more autonomy in their affairs.  However, even when a minor is 
deemed competent to make decisions in one area of the law, he may 
                                                     
 63.  Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979) (plurality opinion) (quoting May v. Anderson, 
345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
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still be deemed incompetent to make decisions regarding his closely 
connected contractual affairs.64 
Professor Daniel discusses tort law, criminal law, and consent law as 
specific examples,65 all of which are discussed below.  Although we 
disagree with Professor Daniel that other areas of law are inconsistent 
with the infancy doctrine, she correctly recognizes that, superficially, 
these many areas of law may appear inconsistent. 
Professor Rhonda Hartman also finds inconsistency in these laws.  
She states that “social norms that are closely allied with governing law 
treat adolescents as though they are decisionally capable, producing a 
kaleidoscope approach to adolescent rights with endless variegated 
exceptions and circuitous results.”66  She specifically cites consent to 
medical treatment as an area where “[t]he rules that result from 
presumptive decisional incapacity ‘meander like a restless wind inside a 
letter box, tumbling blindly’ as they inadequately address adolescent 
issues.”67 
This line of criticism is not new.  The infancy doctrine has frequently 
been criticized as being inconsistent with other areas of the law.  For 
example, in 1965, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire stated that “[a] 
stranger must think it strange that a minor in certain cases may be liable 
for his torts and responsible for his crimes and yet is not bound by his 
contracts.”68  Similarly, in the 1980s, Professor Wadlington wrote that 
“[a]s a result of this somewhat haphazard process, the rules regarding 
majority today are a melange of legal anachronism and contemporary 
expediency which reflect only minimally our current understanding 
about the intellectual and emotional capacities and interests of young 
persons.”69 
Notwithstanding these critiques, when other areas of the law are put 
into context and viewed in light of competing policies, they are fully 
consistent with the goal of protecting minors.  Even the seeming 
exceptions to the rules of “presumptive decisional incapacity” recognize 
that minors are vulnerable and are the exceptions are justified by minors’ 
                                                     
 64.  Juanda Lowder Daniel, Virtually Mature: Examining the Policy of Minors’ Incapacity to 
Contract Through the Cyberscope, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 239, 261 (2008). 
 65.  Id. at 262–67. 
 66.  Hartman, supra note 12, at 1267. 
 67.  Id. (quoting THE BEATLES, ACROSS THE UNIVERSE (EMI Blackwood Music Inc. 1968)). 
 68.  Porter v. Wilson, 209 A.2d 730, 731 (N.H. 1965). 
 69.  Walter J. Wadlington, Consent to Medical Care for Minors: The Legal Framework, in 
CHILDREN’S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 57, 57 (Gerald P. Koocher et al. eds., 1983). 
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best interests.  Rather than undermine the infancy doctrine, a comparison 
of the major areas of law reinforces it. 
A. Tort Law 
Under tort law, minors have always been held liable for their 
intentional torts,70 and most jurisdictions hold at least some minors liable 
for mere negligence.71  However, most jurisdictions temper this rule by 
deeming very young minors incapable of negligence based on their 
limited capacities, especially for children under seven years old,72 or by 
courts taking into account the limited capacities in deciding how a 
“reasonable minor” with similar age and capabilities should act.73 
It does not implicate the infancy doctrine to permit the punishment of 
minors for acts, which, similar to crimes, are a knowing violation of 
malum in se social norms that the law has incorporated as intentional 
torts.74  Intentional torts are the kinds of conduct that require very little 
judgment to recognize as unacceptable in society.  In this case, society 
has determined that the value of holding minors who act with intent 
accountable for their harmful actions outweighs the protections that they 
may deserve in other contexts, because minors must be taught what is 
allowed and what is not.  But this slice of liability is narrow and different 
in kind than the infancy doctrine.  These rules are unrelated to protecting 
minors from injury to themselves.  Rather they are post hoc punishment 
directed at consequences for injuries a minor has caused to others who 
did not choose to deal knowingly with a minor for financial gain.  
Criminal law strikes a similar balance, as addressed below.75 
Even with respect to mere negligence, tort doctrine is clearly 
distinguishable from contract doctrine, both in practical application and 
in policy.  First, tort victims do not choose who commits a tort against 
them.  They become victims of whatever tortfeasor comes along, 
                                                     
 70.  See, e.g., VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS 17 (12th 
ed. 2010) (illustrating minors’ ability to form the requisite intent for an intentional tort using Garratt 
v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955)). 
 71.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1979). 
 72.  Id. § 283A cmt. b.  For a list of jurisdictions that cut off liability for young minors, see the 
cases in the reporter’s notes for section 283A. 
 73.  Id. § 283A. 
 74.  See Dawson v. Contractors Transp. Corp., 467 F.2d 727, 729 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(explaining that tortfeasors may recover a portion of a settlement from joint tortfeasors where “the 
tort is not intentional or malum in se.”). 
 75.  See infra Part III.B. 
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notwithstanding their efforts to avoid dangerous situations and people.  A 
person cannot avoid falling victim to a tort committed by a minor, unless 
by never venturing out of an adult-only community.  On the other hand, 
contracting parties always have the ability to choose with whom they 
contract and can choose to contract only after taking reasonable measures 
to assure that the other party is an adult with legal capacity to be bound.  
Thus, tort liability for the conduct of minors against innocent victims 
does not conflict with the contract infancy doctrine.  In contract law, an 
adult can easily avoid the consequences by not contracting with minors. 
Second, parents are ultimately liable for the consequences of a tort 
committed by a minor.76  Tort law puts the onus on adults to teach their 
children to adhere to basic social decencies or to exercise sufficient 
control over their children to stop them from harming others.77  Thus, the 
deterrent effect of tort law is to motivate parents to control or teach their 
children before unleashing them on society.78  Moreover, legal 
enforcement of a tort judgment is ultimately against the parent.79  The 
purposes of tort law—to deter wrongful conduct and compensate the 
injured party80—focus ultimately on adults as responsible agents, not on 
any assumption that minors are responsible agents. 
Third, tort law is not formulated intentionally to discourage adult 
interaction with minors.  One of the express purposes of the infancy 
doctrine is to warn adults to stay away from minors when entering 
financial transactions.81  Contract law, as with all areas of law, aims at 
the behavior of adults, with the intent to stop adults from taking 
advantage of the vulnerabilities of youth.82  Similarly, tort law aims at 
stopping adults from allowing untrained children to wreak havoc on 
neighbors.  Contract law assumes exchanges of consideration that have 
an economic contour, even if not always set forth in terms of cash.83  The 
                                                     
 76.  Randall K. Hanson, Parental Liability for Torts of Children: Balancing the Rights of 
Victims and Parents, 9 MIDWEST L. REV. 77, 79 (1990) (“All states have passed modern tort statutes 
imposing varying degrees of responsibility on parents for the wrongful actions of their children.”). 
 77.  Id. at 79–80, 84 (stating that increases in parental liability ceilings “indicate a trend toward 
imposing greater parental responsibility for juvenile misconduct,” and that such increases “would 
encourage parents to exercise greater influence over their children’s activities”). 
 78.  Id. at 79. 
 79.  See id. at 78–79 (noting that most minors are insolvent). 
 80.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979); see also Schickling v. Aspinall, 369 
S.E.2d 172, 174 (Va. 1988); Borish v. Russell, 230 P.3d 646, 650 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). 
 81.  See 43 C.J.S. Infants § 210 (2010). 
 82.  See id. 
 83.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981). 
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law wants adults to conduct such exchanges only with other adults, as 
greed could cause adults to lure children into improvident transactions.84  
The adult has a safe option in conducting the transaction with the child’s 
parent or guardian instead.  Society squarely discourages adults from 
being physically near to or otherwise interacting with children without 
parents around to avoid exploitation of children for other purposes, such 
as in online chat rooms, adult businesses, and restraints on the movement 
of sexual predators.85 
An adult acting with reasonable care can avoid entering contracts 
with minors in all cases except ones where the minor affirmatively 
misrepresents his age and the adult, after reasonable inquiry and 
investigation, has no reason to suspect the deception.  The infancy 
doctrine makes an exception to protect adults in such cases.86  Adults 
who contract with minors put themselves in a situation that could have 
been avoided altogether, unlike victims of torts.  The infancy doctrine is 
entirely consistent with the purpose of contract law, which is “to enforce 
the reasonable expectations of parties induced by promises,”87 because 
adults are expected to know that transactions with minors may be 
voidable by the minor. 
B. Criminal Law 
Similar policy reasons exist to explain supposed inconsistencies in 
criminal law.88  Recent changes in the treatment of minors in criminal 
law are highly consistent with the policies and aims of contract law and 
show a marked movement toward greater protection of minors and taking 
into account their cognitive limitations.89 
The value of protecting perpetrators of crime carries obvious weight 
when it comes to minors.  The juvenile justice system focuses on 
                                                     
 84.  See 43 C.J.S. Infants § 210 (2010). 
 85.  See, e.g., Sex Offender Registration & Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. § 16913 (2006) 
(requiring sex offenders to register and keep current an address in the jurisdiction where the offender 
resides), invalidated by United States v. Nasci, 632 F. Supp. 2d 194 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 86.  Preston & Crowther, supra note 6, at 59–62. 
 87.  6 JOHN E. MURRAY, JR. & TIMOTHY MURRAY, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 570 (Interim ed. 
Supp. 2009). 
 88.  See Daniel, supra note 64, at 263–67. 
 89.  See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (holding that nonhomicide 
juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole); Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (holding that juvenile offenders cannot receive the death penalty). 
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rehabilitation over other penological justifications.90  This reasoning is 
tied to studies that show antisocial, or criminal, tendencies in most 
youths are often fleeting and are usually outgrown.91  It is simply too 
difficult to distinguish those individuals whose criminal natures are 
“permanent” from those who will naturally reform once they mature.  
Supreme Court precedent reflects this rationale,92 recognizing that 
minors are not formed and fixed and that their fluidity is a source of vast 
vulnerability, the kind of vulnerability protected by the infancy doctrine. 
Indeed, criminal law in some extreme cases blurs the cutoff between 
minors and adults, allowing transfer of older adolescents to adult court 
when they have committed a serious and, typically, violent offense.93  
Treating some minors as adults in this situation does not undermine the 
incapacity rationales of the infancy doctrine; at best, it may be precedent 
for finding a way to classify a few minors as unlike the majority under 
the rule if some outrageous conduct is involved.  In the case of serious 
crime, society’s desire for crime control and effective law enforcement 
may take precedence over the arguments of immaturity, which still play a 
role in deciding whether such treatment is appropriate;94 but, the transfer 
to adult court of certain minors does not erase other protections now in 
place for minors.  In addition, as one commentator has noted, “a 
plausible argument could be made that the decision to make a contract is 
more difficult and requires greater capacity than resisting a compulsion 
to kill someone.”95 
With respect to the more significant issues in criminal law, the trend 
has been to increase protections based on our conception of the abilities 
of individuals under age eighteen. With respect to capital punishment, in 
Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court detailed an evolution toward even 
stricter adherence to the notion that children under the age of eighteen 
must be treated differently than adults.96  The Court held that the 
Constitution barred capital punishment against minors.97  Sixteen years 
earlier in Stanford v. Kentucky, the Court approved a state statute that 
                                                     
 90.  Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 578 
(2000). 
 91.  Id. at 587. 
 92.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011; Roper, 543 U.S. 551. 
 93.  Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and Consistent 
Vision of Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 275, 345 (2006). 
 94.  Id. at 344, 347–48. 
 95.  Id. at 350. 
 96.  543 U.S. 551, 561–64 (2005). 
 97.  Id. at 575. 
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allowed the execution of offenders over age fifteen but under age 
eighteen, thus recognizing something like a “mature” minor exception.98  
However, the Roper Court, armed with greater knowledge about the 
developing mind, overruled Stanford, supporting a consistent trend 
toward abolishing the death penalty for juveniles between ages sixteen 
and eighteen.99  “[T]he consistency in the trend toward abolition of the 
practice—provide[s] sufficient evidence that today our society views 
juveniles, in the words Atkins used respecting the mentally retarded, as 
‘categorically less culpable than the average criminal.’”100  In addition, 
the Court “acknowledge[d] the overwhelming weight of international 
opinion against the juvenile death penalty, resting in large part on the 
understanding that the instability and emotional imbalance of young 
people may often be a factor in the crime.”101  
Since Roper, the Supreme Court has continued this trend in Graham 
v. Florida, where it held that juvenile nonhomicide offenders could not 
be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.102  The Court reasoned 
that “[i]t remains true that ‘[f]rom a moral standpoint it would be 
misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a 
greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be 
reformed.’”103  Such reasoning is entirely consistent with the infancy 
doctrine, which recognizes that minors lack capacity and develop 
maturity and character over time. 
C. Healthcare Law 
1. Consent to Treatment 
Minors generally may not consent to their own medical treatment.104  
Instead, their parents or guardians have legal responsibility for making 
the complex decisions related to medical care.  As with the contract 
infancy doctrine, the parental consent theory seeks to protect minors 
                                                     
 98.  492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989), overruled in part by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 99.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 566–67. 
 100.  Id. at 567 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)).  
 101.  Id. at 578. 
 102.  130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
 103.  Id. at 2026–27 (second alteration in original) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570). 
 104.  Scott, supra note 90, at 566 (citing Susan D. Hawkins, Note, Protecting the Rights and 
Interests of Competent Minors in Litigated Medical Treatment Disputes, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075, 
2075 (1996); Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents 
to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589, 1589 (1982)). 
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from poor decisions that may have lasting physical and mental impact.  
There are, however, some situations where minors are not required to 
have parental consent.  An analysis of these exceptions illustrates why 
none of them tarnishes the fundamental principles underlying the infancy 
doctrine.  Further, even when an exception applies, doctor ethics, 
hospital policies, and some states still require providers “to determine 
and document that the services are clinically indicated for the minor’s 
well-being,” effectually affirming the principle that limits minors’ 
abilities to decide for themselves.105 
Orthodontic braces, aesthetic surgery, and other limited-pain 
nonessential treatments are the closest comparisons to the kind of things 
a minor would choose to obtain in the same way a minor chooses to enter 
into a contract for a motorcycle or a computer game.  In such instances 
minors might want some cosmetic treatment based on a friend’s 
opinions, or their own self-conscious insecurities, or with the 
encouragement of a physician looking to take advantage of the minor’s 
poor decision-making. 
Medical emergencies are generally an exception to this rule requiring 
parental consent, and services provided to minors without parental 
consent in emergency situations are rarely challenged.106  This relaxation 
of the ordinary requirement “facilitates necessary treatment when 
parental consent may be hard to get, under circumstances in which it is 
assumed that parents would likely consent.”107  For example, adolescents 
may go rock climbing or jet-skiing under circumstances where their 
parents are not with them and cannot be contacted quickly.  In such 
cases, providing medical services may directly be a way of mitigating the 
youth’s reckless or poor decisions.  The exception to parental consent in 
emergency medical treatments seeks to relieve minors from harm in 
situations where a parent or guardian cannot be found; the exception is 
obviously protection oriented.  It permits healthcare providers to react in 
                                                     
 105.  Rhonda Gay Hartman, Coming of Age: Devising Legislation for Adolescent Medical 
Decision-Making, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 409, 420 (2002). 
 106.  Scott, supra note 900, at 567 & n.79 (citing Angela R. Holder, Minor’s Rights to Consent 
to Medical Care, 257 JAMA 3400, 3400 (1987)) (arguing that there have been very few cases in 
which a physician has been sued for non-negligent care of an adolescent without parental consent); 
see also Committee on Pediatric Emergency Medicine, Consent for Emergency Medical Services for 
Children and Adolescents, 111 PEDIATRICS 703, 703 (2003) (“[E]very state has enacted minor 
consent statutes addressing some or all of these exceptions to the ‘general rule’ [of requiring parental 
consent].”). 
 107.  Scott, supra note 90, at 567. 
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an emergency.108 It is difficult to conceive of an “emergency” where 
minors must enter a contract before their parents can be located, except 
for contracts where minors are emancipated and, without the care and 
support of parents, must fend for themselves.  The infancy doctrine has 
an exception for such cases, as well.109 
Even when immediately and presently suffering the consequences, 
minors sometimes defy their own best interests.  Adolescents are 
frequently exposed to drugs, alcohol, sexual diseases, and other dangers 
to their health.  The law tries to protect minors from their own “bad 
decisions that could adversely impact their health.”110  Legislatures have 
determined there would be an unacceptable risk to minors if parental 
consent was required for minors to get medical help for these 
problems.111  Teenagers might conceal their addiction or condition, rather 
than obtain needed treatment or counsel, out of fear for their parents’ 
reactions,112 or because they live in an abusive home.113  Moreover, 
society has an interest in reducing the incidences of these problems in the 
teen population,114 especially with respect to communicable diseases.  
Making an exception to deal with particular kinds of problems in certain 
cases after the teen has exercised bad judgment is not inconsistent with 
the infancy doctrine’s focus on discouraging adults from inducing teens 
into financial transactions. 
In healthcare law, some courts have recognized a “mature minor” 
doctrine, which is an ad hoc equivalent of the emancipated minor 
exception in the contract law infancy doctrine.  It has gained some 
recognition as an acceptable judicial bypass to broader parental consent 
requirements.115  The Supreme Court explains the doctrine as applying in 
                                                     
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Preston & Crowther, supra note 6, at 52–57. 
 110.  Cunningham, supra note 93, at 317. 
    111. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6929(b) (West 2012) (providing that parental consent is 
needed in cases of a minor seeking treatment for drug and alcohol related problems); VT. STAT. 
ANN. TIT. 18, § 4226 (West 2012) (providing that if a minor has or is suspected of having drug or 
alcohol related issues or a sexually transmitted disease, parental consent is not necessary).   
 112.  Scott, supra note 90, at 568. 
 113.  Id.; see also Hartman, supra note 12, at 1309–10. 
 114.  Scott, supra note 90, at 568. 
 115.  Eight states statutorily allow minors to try for the mature minor exception to parental or 
physician decision-making.  NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 341–71 (Richard A. Leiter ed., 6th 
ed. 2008).  Many other courts seem to grant similar case-by-case exceptions, although without the 
same label. 
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instances where a court has made a determination that a particular minor 
“is mature and capable of giving informed consent.”116 
Because adolescence is a transition stage from childhood to 
adulthood,117 it may seem that the mature minor adjudication in medical 
consent law indicates the minor has adult-like decisional capacity.  In 
application, however, the interpretation of “mature” and “capable” is 
usually based on whether the minor’s desires appear to be mature and 
capable in the circumstances, not whether the minor individually is 
sufficiently mature to be capable of broad decision-making ability.  The 
doctrine is, in practice, more like deciding the specific medical procedure 
is in the minor’s best interests, rather than that the minor is mature 
enough to consent to a specific medical procedure.118  In addition, the 
determination of whether or not a minor is mature is based on the 
minor’s capacity for factual understanding rather than her reasoning 
capabilities.119  Thus, the mature minor standard does not support the 
argument that older minors be stripped of the protections of the infancy 
doctrine. 
These judicial bypasses to ordinary parental consent requirements, 
such as emergency treatment or mature minor standards, are not always 
in response to a request by a minor.  Physicians can also use best-
interests decisions to overcome parental consent or lack of consent and, 
in some cases, to force treatment on an unwilling minor.  For instance, 
Thomas, a fifteen-year-old boy, was diagnosed with a mediastinal 
tumor.120  His biological father died from a lung cancer tumor just a few 
months before.  To save Thomas, his doctors determined that diagnostic 
surgery was needed immediately.121  Thomas refused because of “his 
‘strong phobia for needles.’”122  Unsurprisingly, the family court granted 
                                                     
 116.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992). 
 117.  See C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the Bathwater: Adolescent Offending and Punitive 
Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 659, 691–92 (2005); Terry A. Maroney, The False 
Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 97 (2009). 
 118.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. LaWall, 189 F. Supp. 2d 975, 981–82 (D. Ariz. 
2001) (reasoning that the Arizona statute directs a judge to begin with the maturity assessment, then 
use a best-interests approach if she finds the minor not mature, though finding a minor not mature is 
itself an assessment of best interests). 
 119.  Daniel, supra note 64, at 266; see also Scott, supra note 90, at 568 (“No one argues that 
minors should be deemed adults because they are particularly mature in making decisions in these 
treatment contexts.”). 
 120.  In re Thomas B., 574 N.Y.S.2d 659, 660 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991). 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
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the state the power to proceed with the surgery over Thomas’s 
protests.123 
The mature minor doctrine is not tied to a sense that children are 
sufficiently mature as they near age eighteen and should have more 
deference.  One case involved a young man “just weeks shy of his 18th 
birthday.”124  He was diagnosed with cancer and told that blood 
transfusions would be necessary to offset the effects of chemotherapy.125  
Based on religious beliefs, he and his parents refused the blood 
transfusions.126  Though some minors have been adjudicated mature in 
similar circumstances,127 this young man was not.128  The court 
determined that “his refusal to consent to blood transfusions is not based 
upon a mature understanding of his own religious beliefs or of the fatal 
consequences to himself.”129  This finding came just after the court stated 
that this was an “intelligent, articulate young man.”130 
In another case, the Illinois Supreme Court declared that a person 
very nearly eighteen may well be adjudged to be mature by the trial court 
if she “is mature enough to appreciate the consequences of her actions, 
and [she] is mature enough to exercise the judgment of an adult.”131  In 
the end the determination of whether the minor understands the 
consequences seems to turn on whether the minor is making a choice that 
satisfies their adult judge’s sense of what is in the minor’s best interests. 
The development of the mature minor doctrine is not a recognition of 
changing trends in maturation suggesting that the age of consent should 
be lowered.  Rather, it is a vehicle whereby a court can override parental 
consent statutes and decisions made by minors because the judge or 
medical personnel determines that a treatment is in the child’s best 
interests.  It is not used to force minors to live with the consequences of 
bad decisions and thus has no parallel to the infancy doctrine. 
                                                     
 123.  Id. at 661. 
 124.  In re Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 557 N.Y.S.2d 239, 243 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990). 
 125.  Id. at 241. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  See, e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ill. 1989). 
 128.  Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 557 N.Y.S.2d at 243. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id.  
 131.  In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 327–28.  
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2. Consent to Abortion 
Prior to Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,132 almost every state 
required parental consent for medical procedures, even abortions.  In 
Danforth, the Supreme Court held that always requiring parental consent 
for minors to have abortions was unconstitutional unless there is some 
form of judicial bypass available, slight as it may be.133  Most states have 
responded by inserting exceptions similar to those for basic medical 
treatment,134 thereby satisfying the Supreme Court’s requirement of 
alternatives to protect a child’s possible best interests in varying 
circumstances.  This allows the minor to choose to have an abortion if 
another adult, in most states a judge,135 decides that it is either in the 
minor’s best interests or that the minor has sufficient “maturity” to make 
the decision herself,136 which in practice still translates into what the 
judge believes is in the minor’s best interests. 
Only Connecticut statutorily allows minors to consent to their own 
abortions without some parental notice or consent, or judicial 
oversight.137 Even then, adult involvement is required at some point.  
Connecticut requires a physician to give information to the minor and 
“[d]iscuss the possibility of involving the minor’s parents, guardian or 
other adult family members in the minor’s decision-making concerning 
the pregnancy and whether the minor believes that involvement would be 
                                                     
 132.  428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
 133.  Id. at 74; see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 900–01 (1992) 
(upholding Pennsylvania statute containing one-parent consent requirement with a judicial bypass 
option); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520 (1990) (holding that judicial 
bypass provision was sufficient even though minor was required to meet a heightened standard of 
proof to evince her best interests or personal maturity); Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kan. City, Mo., 
Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 494 (1982) (upholding Missouri statute requiring parental or juvenile 
court consent for an abortion). 
 134.  NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS, supra note 115, at 341–71. 
 135.  In Maryland, the attending physician may make a judgment concerning a minor’s best 
interests and waive the requirement for parental notice. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 20-103(c) 
(West 2009).  
 136.  Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643–44 (1979). 
 137.  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-601 (2011) (providing that minors must receive counseling 
prior to receiving an abortion, and discussing whether the minor’s parents should be involved); see 
also NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS, supra note 115, at 341–71 (summarizing state abortion 
laws); TRACY TRULY, TEEN RIGHTS 261–321 (1st ed. 2002) (same).  Florida law has vacillated as 
the courts and legislature have fought it out, but currently, the law requires parental notification or 
judicial bypass.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.01114 (2011) (enacted by a constitutional amendment).  
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in the minor’s best interests.”138  The decision is then left to the minor 
after the mandated counseling.139 
The Supreme Court’s explanation for requiring these exceptions to 
parental consent is not based on a holding that minors are fully capable 
of making complex decisions, but rather that the law needs to protect the 
best interests of children.  The Court reasons that sometimes leaving the 
decision with parents may result in harm to the minor.140  As with drug 
abuse, sexually transmitted diseases, and pregnancy generally, some 
minors considering having an abortion may have legitimate reasons to 
fear their parents’ response, primarily because of abusive circumstances 
at home.141  Where parents’ interests do not align with a pregnant 
minor’s best interests, such as when parents might be more concerned 
about themselves and their reputation in the community than the long-
term consequences to their minor child, the state may determine it must 
step in to protect the welfare of the child.142 The state does not simply 
grant the minor decision-making authority without supervision. 
In Bellotti v. Baird, the Court addressed specifically a pregnant 
minor’s vulnerability.143  The Court recognized that an unmarried 
pregnant minor was in an especially vulnerable situation “considering 
her probable education, employment skills, financial resources, and 
emotional maturity,”144 and that “a girl of tender years, under emotional 
stress, may be ill-equipped to make [the decision for an abortion] without 
mature advice and emotional support.”145  Ultimately, the framework 
established by the Supreme Court exists to protect minors rather than to 
give them more autonomy in making important decisions.  When 
speaking of a minor’s “rights” under the exceptions, the Court focuses on 
a minor’s right to be free from further abuse that may result from 
parental involvement and places the state in the parental role. 
                                                     
 138.  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-601(a)(5). 
 139.  Id. § 19a-601(b). 
 140.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992). 
 141.  Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 438–39 (1990). 
 142.  See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (“[M]any parents hold strong views on the 
subject of abortion, and young pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are particularly 
vulnerable to their parents’ efforts to obstruct both an abortion and their access to court.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 143.  Id. at 634, 639 (stating that the background for the constitutional issue was “the peculiar 
vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; 
and the importance of the parental role in child rearing”). 
 144.  Id. at 642. 
 145.  Id. at 641. 
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Once a minor is pregnant, the state’s interest in protecting her from 
some serious choices she probably does not understand and cannot fully 
calculate, and from vulnerability to the influences of others especially 
adults, is in many respects too late.  An acknowledgement of the forces 
in society that leave pregnant teens unable to care for and raise a child in 
a stable environment is a recognition of their vulnerability and not 
inconsistent with the infancy doctrine in contracts.  If a teen is married, 
in military service, or otherwise living as an adult away from parents, the 
exceptions for emancipation and necessaries under the infancy doctrine 
applies.146 
D. Family Law and Custody Disputes 
In family law, many states permit older minors to have input in 
resolving custody disputes.147  This “input” should not be confused with 
an ultimate right to decide, which still rests with the judge.148  In each 
child custody dispute, the state functions as parens patriae, acting as the 
child’s parent to determine what is in the child’s best interest.149  In the 
family law setting, courts may take an individualized approach, focusing 
on the individual maturity of the child rather than setting a bright-line 
cutoff for the ability to be involved in choosing custodial 
arrangements.150  At first sight, it may seem that courts deem some 
children mature enough to contribute to critical life decisions in family 
law, while at the same time, treating them as insufficiently mature to 
enter into basic contracts, but a closer look belies this. 
Trial courts have wide discretion when awarding child custody, and 
many have recognized that the child’s wishes are a factor to consider, 
where appropriate.151  Before accounting for the child’s wishes, a court 
will judge the maturity of the minor based on the individual minor’s 
“age, intelligence, and discretion to exercise an enlightened judgment . . . 
                                                     
 146.  Preston & Crowther, supra note 6, at 55. 
 147.  D.W. O’Neill, Annotation, Child’s Wishes as Factor in Awarding Custody, 4 A.L.R.3D 
1396 § 3 (1965). 
 148.  Id. §§ 1(a), 2(a). 
 149.  43 C.J.S. Infants § 4 (2004). 
 150.  O’Neill, supra note 147, § 9. 
 151.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Andersen, 603 N.E.2d 70, 73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (“The trial 
court should give considerable weight to a mature child’s custodial preference when it is based on 
sound reasoning.”); Pekarek v. Pekarek, 384 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that, 
although the children were sufficiently mature, the trial court did not err in not asking for the 
children’s preferences because they were in a “confused and anxious state”). 
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as to [her] future welfare.”152  However, even where courts account for 
the wishes of the child, those wishes are ultimately subordinated to what 
the judge deems the “best interests of the child,” which may not align 
with that child’s wishes.153 
This approach to considering children’s wishes in child custody 
disputes, although different in form, still has the same goal as the infancy 
doctrine, to protect children.  An individualized approach to maturity is 
much easier to apply ex-ante, before any parties have relied on whether 
the minor is sufficiently mature.  In a child custody dispute, adults 
unfamiliar with the minor do not need to evaluate the maturity of the 
minor before making legal choices, as would be required if a “mature” 
minor were given contracting ability.  Rather, in the midst of an existing 
dispute, a judge, who also may require professional psychological 
assessments,154 is afforded plentiful input from parents in evaluating the 
minor’s maturity to decide how much weight her preference will be 
given.155  Such assessments of maturity would be a wholly unworkable 
process in contract law.  In that situation, a well-meaning adult’s 
incorrect judgment would be penalized when a judge disagrees about the 
minor’s capacity.  A bright-line age of majority based on an objective 
fact permits adults to determine capacity to contract by requiring age 
verification or a good faith effort at verification.156 
E. Other Age-Based Legal Standards 
Many laws draw definitive lines based on age.  The majority of age-
based protections cover those under age eighteen, as does the infancy 
doctrine. For example, voting age is eighteen.157  The list also includes 
prohibitions on gambling158 and driving without parental consent.159  
                                                     
 152.  O’Neill, supra note 147, § 2(a). 
 153.  See, e.g., Kelly v. Kelly, 640 N.W.2d 38, 45 (N.D. 2002) (“The preference of the children 
‘can be an important factor to consider when determining the best interests of the child.’” (quoting 
Loll v. Loll, 561 N.W.2d 625, 629 (N.D. 1997))). 
 154.  Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Right to Require Psychiatric or Mental Examination for Party 
Seeking to Obtain or Retain Custody of Child, 99 A.L.R.3D 268 § 3(a) (1980). 
 155.  See O’Neill, supra note 147, § 15 (discussing cases that place the right of a natural parent 
above a child’s wishes to be in the custody of a guardian). 
 156.  The defenses available to adults who are fraudulently misled by minors in the attempt to 
verify age are discussed in Preston & Crowther, supra note 6, at 59–62. 
 157.  Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, app. A (1988) (plurality opinion). 
 158.  Id. at 395 (“Where gambling is legal, adolescents under 18 are generally not permitted to 
participate in it.”). 
 159.  Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 394–95 (1989) (“Thirty-four states require parental 
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Minors do not have a Second Amendment right to bear arms.160  
Additionally, some states prohibit employing minors during school 
hours161 and body piercing or tattooing minors.162  Most states prohibit 
selling pornographic material to individuals under age seventeen.163 
Of particular interest is that some legal standards are higher than age 
eighteen.  For instance, the minimum drinking age is statutorily set at 
twenty-one in all states,164 and some states even have a minimum age for 
using tobacco products that is greater than eighteen.165  One of the latest 
examples is the Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and 
Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009, which prohibits issuing credit cards to 
anyone under age twenty-one without an adult cosigner.166 
These numerous age-based laws reinforce that protecting minors is 
still a prevalent part of our law.  Across legal disciplines, these 
restrictions are fundamentally consistent.  Where the law appears to 
depart from the norm of treating children as having a legal disability, 
such as specific instances where minors have been given greater 
decisional autonomy for medical decision-making, the underlying 
principle is still protecting minors rather than a statement that minors no 
longer need protection.  A comparison across legal fields does not 
suggest the infancy doctrine is outdated. 
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CATEGORICAL AGE DETERMINATIONS 
The infancy doctrine is predictable and easy to apply because it relies 
on a categorical, objectively measurable standard based on counting 
                                                                                                                       
consent before a person below 18 may drive a motor car.”), overruled in part by Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 160.  Cheryl B. Preston, Zoning the Internet: A New Approach to Protecting Children Online, 
2007 BYU L. REV. 1417, 1438 (2007). 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Stanford, 492 U.S. at 395 (“Legislation in 42 States prohibits those under 18 from 
purchasing pornographic materials.”). 
 164.  Seymour Moskowitz, Save the Children: The Legal Abandonment of American Youth in the 
Workplace, 43 AKRON L. REV. 107, 145 (2010) (citing Ken Sternberg, Alcohol Consumer Must Be 
21 Years Old in All States; Concerns Remain About Drunk Driving, 260 JAMA 2479, 2479 (1988)). 
 165.  Id. & n.279 (citing Ctrs. for Disease Control, State Laws on Tobacco Control—United 
States, 1998, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 21, 26 (1999)) (stating that Alabama, 
Alaska, and Utah have set the minimum age at nineteen). 
 166.  Annamaria Lusardi et al., Financial Literacy Among the Young, 44 J. CONSUMER AFF. 358, 
360 (2010).  For a critique of the CARD Act, see Andrew A. Schwartz, Old Enough to Fight, Old 
Enough to Swipe: A Critique of the Infancy Rule in the Federal Credit Card Act, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 
407 (2011).  
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eighteen years from a date of birth in a country where everyone has a 
birth certificate.167  Age or actual birthdates are included in drivers’ 
licenses, school identifications, and other forms of identification.  Of 
course, determining that all children become responsible as adults at 
eighteen is arbitrary.  The infancy doctrine has been criticized because of 
its categorical age cutoff.  Some argue that determinations of who should 
be treated as adults under the law should be resolved with a case-by-case 
approach.168 
As one commentator put it: “It is quizzical at best to grasp the 
concept that in the blink of an eye, a person sheds infancy and attains 
adulthood the moment the person’s eighteenth birthday is realized.”169  
Those who take this position generally support a rebuttable presumption 
of capacity for adolescents that would be subject to a factual inquiry of 
incapacity at the minors’ request.170 
Drawing the line at eighteen years of age is subject, of course, to the 
objections always raised against categorical rules.171  The qualities that 
distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual 
turns eighteen.  By the same token, some under age eighteen have 
already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach.  
However, a line must be drawn.172 
As a matter of constitutional law, categorical lines are perhaps not 
ideal nor necessary for determinations in a world of unlimited resources.  
But, the Supreme Court is quite clear that the age of minority requires a 
fixed line and that the line is appropriate at age eighteen.  Recently, the 
Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida reaffirmed the constitutionality of 
statutory enactments relying on an arbitrary age cutoff.173  Quoting 
                                                     
 167.  Some states follow the common law method of granting adulthood the day before the 
eighteenth birthday.  Preston & Crowther, supra note 6, at 50 n.8.  Currently the cutoff is generally 
at the minor’s eighteenth birthday rather than the day before.  Id.  
 168.  See Brief for Petitioner at 33, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 
WL 903158, at *33; see also supra Part III.D (discussing the individualized approach of family law). 
 169.  Daniel, supra note 64, at 242. 
 170. E.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, Deconstructing the Myth of the “Infancy Law Doctrine”: From 
Incapacity to Accountability, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 481, 524 (1994) (“The right of disaffirmance as 
enunciated in the infancy law doctrine should be eliminated and replaced by a ‘factors’ test to 
determine if a minor lacked the capacity to contract.”); see also Daniel, supra note 64, at 267–68 
(proposing a rebuttable presumption of capacity for adolescents that would allow courts to 
investigate incapacity where alleged by the minor. 
 171.  See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 166, at 409 (“A bright-line rule is likely to be both over- 
and underinclusive, but also predictable and inexpensive.  A flexible standard may be more fair and 
accurate, but also more costly to administer and difficult to predict.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 172.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. 
 173.  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030–34 (2010). 
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Roper, the Graham Court was satisfied with age eighteen because it “is 
the point where society draws the line for many purposes between 
childhood and adulthood.”174 
The choice of age eighteen is mirrored in the international context.175  
The Roper Court noted that 
Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
which every country in the world has ratified save for the United States 
and Somalia, contains an express prohibition on capital punishment for 
crimes committed by juveniles under eighteen.  No ratifying country 
has entered a reservation to the provision prohibiting the execution of 
juvenile offenders.  Parallel prohibitions are contained in other 
significant international covenants.176 
A categorical rule is appropriate here because, among other reasons, 
the differences in adolescents are a result of brain immaturity that cannot 
adequately be judged by a judge or a jury,177 let alone a party seeking a 
contract.  In Roper, relying in part on evidence that psychiatrists are 
forbidden from diagnosing any patient under age eighteen as having 
certain disorders, the Court explained: “It is difficult even for expert 
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime 
reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile 
offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”178  The Graham 
Court agreed with this rejection of the case-by-case approach.179  Even if 
some minors do have sufficient maturity to be treated as adults, “it does 
not follow that courts taking a case-by-case proportionality approach 
could with sufficient accuracy distinguish the few . . . from the many.”180 
Adults who have entered contracts with minors will try to enforce 
them by arguing that the minor in question is sufficiently mature to be 
liable.  Even if courts could reasonably determine the maturity and 
capacity of judgment possessed by a minor at some prior time when she 
                                                     
 174.  Id. at 2016 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 574). 
 175.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 576. 
 176.  Id. (citations omitted) (citing United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37, 
Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3). 
 177.  See Maroney, supra note 117, at 94 (“[B]ecause developmental neuroscience supports only 
probabilistic generalizations about youth as a class, it is unhelpful in making highly individualized 
determinations such as formation of intent.”). 
 178.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by 
Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile 
Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014–16 (2003)).  
 179.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2031–32. 
 180.  Id. at 2032. 
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entered a contract, forcing minors into expensive litigation based on 
subjective, personal facts that must be interpreted by expensive experts 
trained in soft sciences would not necessarily reach better results.181  As 
one commentator noted: 
An individualized system is not necessarily more effective at reducing 
the number of false positives or negatives.  Rather, such a system may 
lead to greater uncertainty because a minor’s rights and responsibilities 
are subject to the whims and assumptions of the particular factfinder 
who is assigned the minor’s case. . . .  The resulting uncertainty means 
that minors or the adults that must interact with them are not put on 
notice as to the former’s legal status.182 
Moreover, those who would benefit most from such an approach 
would be the repeat players: vendors and service providers that have 
thousands of contracts with minors and can afford protracted and 
expensive litigation to create a line of precedent to discourage invocation 
of the infancy doctrine.  The minor who only wishes to avoid a contract 
once in her life could not afford to invest the significant time, money, 
and effort to establish precedent for future cases. 
A legal system that determines the maturity of minors on a case-by-
case basis would inevitably introduce problematic communication issues 
between minors and adults involved in the legal system.  The Graham 
Court’s concerns apply, at least with some force, to the experience of a 
minor in the civil legal system.  Juveniles mistrust adults and have 
limited understanding of the legal system and the risks and benefits to 
weigh in making litigation decisions.  “They are less likely than adults to 
work effectively with their lawyers” to resist liability based on claims of 
maturity.183  This difficulty in weighing long-term consequences and 
developing working relationships, along with a corresponding 
impulsiveness and reluctance to trust counsel, were all recognized by the 
Graham Court as likely to impair the quality of a juvenile defendant’s 
representation.184  Introducing individualized liability to contracts will 
similarly systematically disadvantage minors. 
                                                     
 181.  See Cunningham, supra note 93, at 368–69.  
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032. 
 184.  Id. 
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V. CORE PRINCIPLES BEHIND PROTECTING MINORS 
Supreme Court opinions interpreting the Constitution are a fruitful 
source for statements of foundational jurisprudential principles.  Even in 
cases where the Supreme Court considers statutes subject to strict 
scrutiny, the Court categorically affirms the compelling governmental 
interest states have in protecting minors.185  In addition, the right of 
parents to maintain involvement in legal issues involving minors rises to 
constitutional protection, with the very narrow exceptions discussed 
above where the state becomes parens patriae.186  States are justified in 
limiting the ability of adults to enforce against minors legal obligations 
entered without parental or guardian approval.  This Part examines the 
constitutional bases for protecting minors and supporting parents’ 
discretion in the raising of their children. 
A. Compelling Interest in Protecting Minors 
This governmental interest exists in addition to the duties of parents 
as a matter of “society’s transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of 
children.”187  The Supreme Court declared: 
It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s interest in 
“safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor” is 
“compelling.” . . .  Accordingly, we have sustained legislation aimed at 
protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth even when 
the laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally 
protected rights.188 
This concept, that minors are distinguished from adults even with respect 
to constitutional rights,189was again  reaffirmed in Reno v. ACLU.190  In 
                                                     
 185.  See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 672–73 (2004) (striking down statute because it 
was not narrowly tailored for the compelling governmental interest of protecting minors from 
pornography); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 863 n.30 (1997) (“Appellees also do not 
dispute that the Government generally has a compelling interest in protecting minors from ‘indecent’ 
and ‘patently offensive’ speech.”).  For further discussion of this compelling interest in the context 
of the Child Online Protection Act, see Preston, supra note 160. 
 186.  See supra Part 0.0. 
 187.  People v. Kahan, 206 N.E.2d 333, 334 (N.Y. 1965) (Fuld, J., concurring). 
 188.  New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982) (citations omitted). 
 189.  At one point the Supreme Court reached toward recognizing a free speech right in minors 
attending public schools.  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).  
Critics assert that “Tinker’s reasoning conflicted with the traditional understanding of the judiciary’s 
role in relation to public schooling.”  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 417 (2007) (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  However, the Court has since consistently distanced itself from Tinker, primarily by 
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general, the Supreme Court has consistently held that “age is not a 
suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause.”191  The 
Louisiana Supreme Court agrees that age distinctions are subject only to 
a rational basis test and that “there is a rational basis for treating 
juveniles differently: to promote the interest and welfare of the child.”192 
B. Compelling Interest in Parental Discretion 
Another constitutionally recognized compelling governmental 
interest is supporting parents’ authority to raise their children in the 
manner they see fit.193  “[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently 
recognized that the parents’ claim to authority in their own household to 
direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our 
society.”194  As Professor Preston has discussed elsewhere, “the state 
respects parents’ decisions regarding placing their children in private 
sectarian schools rather than public schools, placing them in schools that 
teach in languages other than English, and, at times, taking them out of 
school altogether.”195 
If parents elect to restrict their teens from entering contracts, the 
government should honor that choice.  Other adults should not override 
that choice by dealing independently with children without parental 
knowledge and involvement.  Parents who believe that their child needs 
to assume the responsibility of a major purchase may cosign a contract or 
create interfamily transactions with whatever consequences they select. 
                                                                                                                       
making broad exceptions.  See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988); 
Morse, 551 U.S. at 397; Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1986).  
 190.  521 U.S. at 864–65 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968)). 
 191.  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991). 
 192.  Recent Court Decisions and Legislation Impacting Juveniles, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & 
POL’Y 403, 421 (2010) (reviewing In re State ex rel. A.J., 27 So. 3d 247 (La. 2009)). 
 193.  See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); see also 
Sheerin N.S. Haubenreich, Parental Rights in Myspace: Reconceptualizing the State’s Parens Patriae 
Role in the Digital Age, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 223, 227 (2009) (“Nearly a century of 
cases [has established] an incontrovertible right to raise one’s child in any manner, subject to very 
few limitations.”). 
 194.  Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639. 
 195.  Preston, supra note 160, at 1441 (citation omitted) (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 
U.S. 373 (1985); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). 
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VI. THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATURES 
The age of majority is set by statute in every state, and most state 
statutes expressly recognize the contract infancy doctrine.  Any change 
to this standard should be made by the state legislatures,196 rather than by 
courts writing in exceptions, misconstruing language, or ignoring 
established doctrine, or by Restatement drafters selecting a slim minority 
position.  Policy decisions based on changing consensus in attitudes 
about adolescents are the province of the state legislatures.197  As the 
Supreme Court has declared, “the basic line-drawing process . . . is 
‘properly within the province of legislatures, not courts.’”198  
Legislatures are far better equipped than the judiciary to handle 
determinations about the capacities and protections of minors because 
they are not limited by a case-or-controversy requirement and “an 
adversary context,”199 and instead can independently investigate societal 
attitudes and explore a variety of solutions. 
The infancy doctrine has been well established in the law since the 
1500s.200  State legislatures reduced the age of majority from the 
historical twenty-one to eighteen in the 1970s, and some have 
customized some of the defenses and exceptions.  Failing to make other 
changes is indicative of a continuing consensus on the doctrine.201  Such 
long-standing consistency in state law “provides an additional reason for 
[a] court to be very hesitant before dabbling in matters involving such 
                                                     
 196.  See Halbman v. Lemke, 298 N.W.2d 562, 567 (Wis. 1980) (“[M]odifications of the rules 
governing the capacity of infants to contract are best left to the legislature.”); Kiefer v. Fred Howe 
Motors, 158 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Wis. 1968) (“[A]ppelant might better seek the change [to the infancy 
doctrine] it proposes in the legislative halls rather than this court.”); Cunningham, supra note 93, at 
369 (“[L]egislative action is the best way to resolve the current conflicts in the law regarding 
children.”). 
 197.  See, e.g., Casella v. SouthWest Dealer Servs., Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 445, 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2007) (quoting Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 687–88 (Cal. 1992)); Hous. Auth. of Macon v. 
Ellis, 655 S.E.2d 621, 623 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Commonwealth Inv. Co. v. Frye, 134 S.E.2d 
39 (Ga. 1963)); Haskin v. Ne. Airways, Inc., 123 N.W.2d 81, 86 (Minn. 1963); Skyline Village Park 
Ass’n v. Skyline Village L.P., 786 N.W.2d 304, 311 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010); Pannozzo v. Anthem 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 787 N.E.2d 91, 99 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). 
 198.  Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275–
76 (1980)). 
 199.  GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S., 445 U.S. 375, 382–83 (1980) (citing Flast 
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)). 
 200.  Preston, supra note 1, at 232. 
 201.  See Watson v. J.C. Penney Co., 605 N.E.2d 723, 725 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (“[W]e conclude 
that the legislature, by not amending the 60-year-old natural accumulation rule, has indicated its 
present satisfaction with that rule.”). 
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fundamental policy questions.”202  Simply put, “the courts ought not 
change an established legal doctrine,”203 by implying exceptions and 
reinterpreting statutory language or otherwise. 
Trends of the past few decades suggest that if legislatures were to 
move the line, the cutoff age would likely increase, not decrease.204  The 
age at which people are marrying has risen over the past few decades, 
and young adults increasingly rely upon parental support beyond the age 
of eighteen.205  The recently enacted federal CARD Act of 2009 included 
an age disability until twenty-one.206  The only Supreme Court 
statements on adolescence in recent years have tightened the protections 
for minors rather than loosen them.207 
VII.CONCLUSION 
The intricacies of the contract infancy doctrine may need 
reconsideration for the digital age.  This process is the province of state 
legislatures.  In any event, the doctrine should not be abandoned for 
irrelevant reasons.  Claims of inconsistencies with the law governing 
minors in tort, criminal law, healthcare law, family law, and other arenas 
are invalid.  These schemes may include more detailed analysis of 
minors’ responsibility or input based on particularized concerns arising 
from the nature of the legal interests represented in each field.  But these 
interests do not align with the interests in contract law.  Moreover, any 
movement in these areas is still inextricably tied to concepts of minors’ 
vulnerabilities and inappropriate pressure from adults in various quarters. 
Further, any change in the infancy doctrine cannot be justified by the 
fact that the age cutoff is a fixed, objective date rather than a measure of 
                                                     
 202.  Id. 
 203.  James v. Hutton, 373 S.W.2d 167, 168 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963). 
 204.  See Ann Coulter, Repeal the 26th Amendment!, ANNCOULTER.COM (Nov. 10, 2010), 
http://www.anncoulter.com/columns/2010-11-10.html (suggesting that the Twenty-sixth 
Amendment should be repealed to raise the voting age based in part on “[b]rain research in the last 
five years at Dartmouth and elsewhere [that] has shown that human brains are not fully developed 
until age 25 and are particularly deficient in their frontal lobes, which control decision-making, 
rational thinking, judgment, the ability to plan ahead and to resist impulses.”).  But see Rodney 
Skager, Extending Childhood into the Teen Years: “Infantilization” and Its Consequences, 
RECLAIMING CHILD. & YOUTH, Summer 2009, at 20 (suggesting that “pronouncements that 
adolescence extends as far as the late 20s” exacerbates “problems experienced or caused by 
adolescents”). 
 205.  Preston & Crowther, supra note 14. 
 206.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1637(c)(8) (West Supp. 2012). 
 207.  See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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relative maturity.  A legislature may decide the costs of litigating the 
individual characteristics of a particular minor is justified by the 
enormity of the issues in some contexts, notwithstanding the systemic 
prejudice against minors in such litigation.  However, the Supreme 
Court’s decisions that imposing the death penalty and life without parole 
on minors, even if murder charges are involved, be based on a 
categorical age line surely suggests that no contract-related dispute 
warrants a more complex individual inquiry.  Protecting minors is a 
constitutionally recognized compelling interest of the state and such 
statutes are subject only to a rational basis analysis.  No jurisprudential 
principles justify a court or the drafters of the Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment in rewriting centuries of contract 
doctrine based on a notion of injustice to adults. 
 
